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Note
Gambling with Equal Protection:
Connecticut’s Exploitation of Mancari
and the Tribal Gaming Framework
ALLISON S. ERCOLANO
Recent legislation passed in Connecticut grants two Indian tribes an
exclusive right to pursue development of the state’s third casino. On one
hand, financial benefits stemming from casinos enhance tribal selfsufficiency, foster tribal wealth, and provide an economic benefit to the
state. On the other hand, legislation that allows for these benefits often
does so by singling out Indians as a separate and distinct entity.
Connecticut’s legislation comes at a precarious time as a legal attack on
the preferential treatment of Indians gains traction in the courts. As it now
stands, federal statutes singling out Indians are not subject to heightened
judicial scrutiny, and will be upheld by a court so long as a legitimate end
is furthered. This Note seeks to explore the boundaries of Connecticut’s
law in comparison with the federal Indian gaming regulatory framework
and contemplates whether the law can serve a legitimate end. After
describing and analyzing the state statute, this Note then suggests that the
current void of legal guidance over preferential state tribal gaming laws
will allow states like Connecticut to exploit Indians in the name of money.
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Gambling with Equal Protection:
Connecticut’s Exploitation of Mancari
and the Tribal Gaming Framework
ALLISON S. ERCOLANO*
I. INTRODUCTION
MGM Resorts International Global Gaming Development, LLC
(“MGM”) is currently working on the construction of a casino in
Springfield, Massachusetts, slotted to open by the fall of 2018, thereby
joining the ranks of the major casinos located in New England.1 More
specifically, MGM’s casino will be the third casino located along the
Interstate 91 corridor between Massachusetts and Connecticut.2 If
combined net profits totaling nearly $1.5 billion in 2014 from nearby
Foxwoods Resort Casino and Mohegan Sun Resort and Casino are any
indication,3 MGM’s new casino stands to deliver significant revenue for
the company. Despite expectations of high revenue, however, recent
legislation passed in Connecticut stands to inhibit some of the expected
profits and slow the success of MGM’s new casino, at least initially.
The Connecticut legislature adopted Special Act No. 15-7 (the “Act”)
on June 19, 2015, after numerous debates and significant revisions to the

*
J.D. Candidate, University of Connecticut School of Law, expected May 2017; B.A., Franklin &
Marshall College, 2012. Thank you to my family for their unwavering support and encouragement,
especially to Millie. Thank you also to the members of the Connecticut Law Review for their diligent
and thoughtful input, and a special thanks to Professor Bethany Berger, for suggesting and encouraging
the topic of this Note.
1
See Philip Marcelo, MGM Asks to Delay Opening Springfield Casino by a Year, WBUR (June
25, 2015), http://www.wbur.org/2015/06/25/mgm-sprinfield-opening-delay [https://perma.cc/93WJ5YWQ] (reporting MGM’s expected opening date for its Springfield, Massachusetts casino to be
September 5, 2018).
2
See PYRAMID ASSOCS., LLC, NORTHEASTERN CASINO GAMING UPDATE 2015,
at 4, 7 (2015), http://www.nathaninc.com/sites/default/files/Pub%20PDFs/2015_Northeastern_Casino_
Gaming_Update.pdf [https://perma.cc/5EB5-CXW2] [hereinafter PYRAMID] (documenting that
Foxwoods Resort Casino is located in Ledyard, Connecticut, approximately eight miles from Interstate
95, and that Mohegan Sun is located in Montville, Connecticut, which is also close to Interstate 95).
Interstate 95 is connected to Interstate 91.
3
See id. at 4 (providing revenue and employment statistics for the two casinos in Connecticut);
Gale Courey Toensing, Report: Foxwoods & Mohegan Sun Hard Hit by Regional Gaming Expansion,
INDIAN COUNTRY (Mar. 10, 2015), http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/2015/03/10/report-fox
woods-mohegan-sun-hard-hit-regional-gaming-expansion-159537
[https://perma.cc/ZMR6-TQ7L]
(providing annual profits information for Connecticut’s two casinos).
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proposed legislation. Entitled “An Act Concerning Gaming,” the Act
grants Connecticut’s two federally-recognized tribes, the Mashantucket
Pequot Tribe and the Mohegan Tribe of Connecticut (the “Tribes”),5 the
ability to jointly register as a “tribal business entity” to build a casino in
Connecticut. After public registration with Connecticut’s Secretary of
State, the newly formed tribal business entity may issue a request to
Connecticut towns to submit proposals for a gaming facility in their
jurisdictions.6 Unsurprisingly, the Act is the subject of recent litigation
filed on behalf of MGM in the United States District Court for the District
of Connecticut.7
This litigation adds to the debate regarding the proper level of judicial
scrutiny to be applied to state legislation granting preferential treatment to
Indian tribes. There has been a push within the last decade, resulting from
the conflation of Indian law with affirmative action, to confine or overturn
the pivotal Supreme Court case, Morton v. Mancari, which allows for
preferential treatment of Indian tribes.8 Connecticut’s recent legislation
extending an exclusive grant to its two federally-recognized tribes to
pursue development of a new casino may result in a new constitutional
framework regarding such preferential treatment. The Act challenges the
traditional relationship established between Indians and the federal
government that allows tribes to be classified as “political” rather than
“racial” groups, by exploiting this relationship seemingly for the sole
purpose of retaining cash flow within the state. This exploitation may be
the trigger that causes an overhaul of Supreme Court jurisprudence
regarding the level of judicial review applied to state gaming laws
preferential to Indians.
Under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, a
state cannot deny any person within its jurisdiction equal protection of the
laws.9 Accordingly, the Constitution requires that any state law carry out a
4

4

See S.B. 1090, 2015 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Conn. 2015).
See NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, FEDERAL AND STATE RECOGNIZED TRIBES
(Feb. 2015), http://www.ncsl.org/research/state-tribal-institute/list-of-federal-and-state-recognized-tribe
s.aspx [https://perma.cc/2RPZ-NVTJ] (providing a list of all federal and state recognized tribes in the
United States).
6
2015 Conn. Acts 1484 (Spec. Sess.).
7
Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, MGM Resorts Int’l Glob. Gaming Dev., LLC
v. Malloy, No. 3:15-cv-1182-AWT (D. Conn. Aug. 4, 2015).
8
417 U.S. 535 (1974); see also Carole Goldberg, American Indians and “Preferential
Treatment”, 49 UCLA L. REV. 943, 951 (2002) (discussing the recent litigation, scholarly work, and
legislation vying to overturn the Supreme Court’s decision regarding legislation that grants preferential
treatment for Indians); infra Part IV.B (discussing further the mounting attack on the Mancari
doctrine).
9
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
5
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legitimate interest in a manner that is rationally related to that interest. 10
This less scrutinizing standard of judicial review, known as rational-basis
review, requires a court to uphold any law that meets a legitimate
governmental purpose.11 As rational-basis review is a less exacting
standard, it is rare for a court to overturn a law under its application.
Supreme Court jurisprudence also requires courts to look closely at
legislation that singles out groups of individuals because of race or national
origin. Under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
legislation that is facially discriminatory or discriminatory in its effect, is
prohibited unless it serves a compelling state interest.12 The standard
applied to race-based or national-origin-based legislation, known as strict
scrutiny review, is applied as a more rigorous standard of review by a
court.13 Ultimately, because of the difference in intensity of the two
standards, the level of judicial scrutiny applied in a challenge to the
constitutionality of the Act will be dispositive in any equal protection
claims brought against it.14
In its lawsuit, MGM claims the Act violates the Equal Protection
Clause because it is facially preferential to Indian tribes, a group that can
be considered a “race” under the constitutional analytic framework. MGM
further argues that Connecticut is unable to advance a compelling state
interest to justify its preferential treatment towards the Tribes, and
therefore the Act should be struck down.15
However, it is not seriously disputed whether Connecticut, or any state,
has a legitimate interest in developing and maintaining casinos within their

10
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996) (“We have attempted to reconcile the principle with
reality by stating that, if a law neither burdens a fundamental right nor targets a suspect class, we will
uphold the legislative classification so long as it bears a rational relation to some legitimate end.”
(citations omitted)).
11
U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 533 (1973).
12
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (“Accordingly, we hold today
that all racial classifications . . . must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny. In other
words, such classifications are constitutional only if they are narrowly tailored measures that further
compelling governmental interests.”).
13
Id. State classifications based on race or national origin must advance a compelling government
interest and must be narrowly tailored to achieve that compelling interest. Id.
14
The level of scrutiny applied is important to the success of the litigation:

If a rational basis test is applied, federal legislation helping federal tribes is usually
found to complement governmental objectives, and easily found constitutional;
conversely, if strict scrutiny is applied, such legislation is usually found
unconstitutional. Thus, parties involved in applicable cases tend to battle over
whether application of strict scrutiny or a rational basis test is most appropriate.
Alexa Koenig & Jonathan Stein, Lost in the Shuffle: State-Recognized Tribes and the Tribal Gaming
Industry, 40 U.S.F. L. REV. 327, 364–65 (2006).
15
See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 13–14, supra note 7. For a more
detailed discussion of MGM’s complaint, see infra Part II.A.
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16

borders. For example, pursuant to existing agreements with the Tribes,
Connecticut shares in the gaming revenues from the Foxwoods and
Mohegan Sun casinos.17 Not only does Connecticut receive twenty-five
percent of the profits of the slot machines from its two casinos, but the
casinos provide jobs for approximately 14,763 people in the state.18 A third
casino with additional slot machines will only increase the revenue the
state receives from the Tribes.19 Moreover, as the two casinos have already
created thousands of jobs for the citizens of the state, a third would likely
accomplish the same.20 It is therefore in Connecticut’s interest to develop
casinos in order to continue to receive revenues from slot machines and to
provide more jobs for its residents.21 Congress itself has acknowledged the
governmental interests of involvement in tribal gaming. A court noted that:
In the [Senate] Committee’s view, both State and tribal
16
Presently, the sixty-four casinos in New England represent a $17 billion industry. PYRAMID,
supra note 2, at vi.
17
See generally Mohegan Tribe-State of Connecticut Gaming Compact, 59 Fed. Reg. 241 (Dec.
16, 1994); Tribal-State Compact Between the Mashantucket Pequot Tribe and the State of Connecticut,
56 Fed. Reg. 105 (May 31, 1991) (detailing the revenue-sharing agreements between Connecticut and
the Tribes, among other specifications); see also COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW
§ 12.05[2], at 891 (Nell Jessup Newton ed., 2012) [hereinafter, COHEN’S HANDBOOK] (“[S]tates have
been able to share in tribal gaming revenues in exchange for exclusive rights to game within a state—at
least as against non-Indian gaming.”); PYRAMID, supra note 2, at 23 (“In Calendar Year 2014,
Foxwoods paid $120,899,855 to the State of Connecticut. Mohegan Sun paid $145,978,050 to the State
of Connecticut in CY 2014.”).
18
See Frequently Asked Questions, CONN. DEP’T. OF CONSUMER PROTECTION: GAMING DIV.
(Sept. 4, 2012), http://ct.gov/dcp/cwp/view.asp?a=4107&q=483116 [https://perma.cc/5W2T-79WK]
(explaining that Connecticut receives 25% of each casino’s slot “win”); PYRAMID, supra note 2, at 4
(providing 2014 employment statistics for Connecticut’s two casinos).
19
The Tribes anticipate opening a third casino with at least 2,000 slot machines and 100 to 150
playing tables. Kenneth R. Gosselin, Tribes Say They Don’t Have Location Selected Yet, HARTFORD
COURANT (Feb. 9, 2016), http://www.courant.com/real-estate/property-line/hc-connecticut-third-casino
-20160208-story.html [https://perma.cc/F8NB-3644].
Assuming the ultimate constitutionality and success of implementing the new Act, the question
will likely become one of market oversaturation: will Connecticut be able to generate new demand,
recapture revenue, and regenerate job positions lost to other states in order to successfully sustain a
third casino? See generally PYRAMID, supra note 2, at viii (explaining that Connecticut will need to
accept a new casino with lower operating and profit margins due to the increased number of casinos
now located throughout New England).
20
See Ken Dixon, Pequots, Mohegans, Sign Deal to Create a Cooperative Casino, CONN. POST
(Sept. 10, 2015), http://www.ctpost.com/news/article/Pequots-Mohegans-will-sign-deal-to-create-a6495639.php [https://perma.cc/RE2E-HM6S] (“A study commissioned by the tribes projected a new
casino could create about 6,000 jobs and generate $78 million in new taxes.”).
21
In the wake of the 2008 recession, however, it is important to note the diminishing return
stemming from gaming not just in Connecticut but across the nation. Gambling is a form of
discretionary spending—that is, the type of spending that is the first to be abandoned in strained
financial times, and the last to come back when the economy returns to normal. Revenue from casinos
has been steadily falling due to the lingering effects of the recession. See PYRAMID, supra note 2, at iv,
ix, xvi, 7 (providing a more in-depth discussion of the effects of consumer spending on revenue profits
at casinos nationwide, including those in Connecticut).

2016]

GAMBLING WITH EQUAL PROTECTION

1275

governments have significant governmental interests in the
conduct of class III gaming. . . . A State’s governmental
interests with respect to class III gaming on Indian lands
include the interplay of such gaming with the State’s public
policy, safety, law and other interests, as well as impacts on
the State’s regulatory system, including its economic
interests in raising revenue for its citizens.22
Connecticut has a valid economic interest in establishing casinos in its
borders. MGM, however, believes that Connecticut has gone too far in
attempting to protect this economic interest.
In addition to raising constitutional questions of equal protection
violations, the advent of Connecticut’s innovative legislation paints a
broader picture of the future relationship between states and tribes in the
realm of tribal gaming. More specifically, Connecticut’s legislation may
serve as the type of legislation that finally results in a revision of Supreme
Court Indian law jurisprudence. This Note proposes that, at this precarious
time where the Supreme Court’s stance on laws favorable toward Indians
is under attack,23 legislation such as this demands a more scrutinizing
judicial review in order to sufficiently rein in states that are seeking to
exploit tribal gaming within their borders.
The following section will introduce Connecticut’s legislation and
provide an overview of the pending MGM litigation. Part III will discuss
relevant Supreme Court precedent in the tribal gaming field and its
subsequent application throughout the circuit courts. Part IV will conclude
with an analysis of the Act’s role in the current framework of Supreme
Court jurisprudence and a prediction of its effect on future constitutional
challenges to state gaming laws granting preferential treatment to Indians.
II. CONNECTICUT SPECIAL ACT 15-7
The Act provides for the development of a casino gaming facility in
any of Connecticut’s towns or cities. Notably under the Act, a proposed
casino can be developed on a site that is not specifically located on the
Tribes’ reservation land that has already been established in Connecticut.24
The Act contains no express provision that the towns’ proposals or the
development agreement be limited to a site on Indian land. Rather, it
provides that “[t]he tribal business entity may enter into a development
22
Artichoke Joe’s Cal. Grand Casino v. Norton, 353 F.3d 712, 726 (9th Cir. 2003) (internal
citations omitted) (emphasis added). For a description of Class III gaming, see infra Part III.A.
23
Gregory Smith & Caroline Mayhew, Apocalypse Now: The Unrelenting Assault on Morton v.
Mancari, 60 FED. L. 47, 51 (2013).
24
See 2015 Conn. Acts 1485 (Spec. Sess.). The Foxwoods Casino and the Mohegan Sun Resort
and Casino are located on the Tribes’ reservation land in Connecticut. PYRAMID, supra note 2, at 4, 7.
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agreement with a municipality regarding the establishment of a possible
casino gaming facility in such municipality.”25 The Act details steps that
the Tribes must take to develop a third casino.26 First, the Tribes are
required to create a “tribal business entity” that is owned exclusively by
their members.27 Leaders for the Tribes took such a step, and on August
24, 2015, registered “MMCT Venture, LLC” with Connecticut’s Secretary
of State.28 In compliance with the Act, MMCT Venture next submitted a
copy of their request for proposals for a development site with
Connecticut’s Department of Consumer Protection, which listed the
request on its website.29 Per the Act, any proposal and agreement is subject
to approval by the Connecticut legislature, which must first amend state
law to provide for the operation of a third casino gaming facility.30 A
proposed casino may not open until this law has been ratified, which is
presumably an arduous process replete with debates and hearings at
25

2015 Conn. Acts 1484 (Spec. Sess.) (emphasis added).
See Kat Greene, MGM Isn’t Harmed by Tribal Casino Law, Conn. Gov. Says, LAW360 (Sept.
23, 2015), http://www.law360.com/articles/706607/mgm-isn-t-harmed-by-tribal-casino-law-conn-govsays [https://perma.cc/6QM5-HPD4] (“The law creates a series of hurdles that the Mashantucket
Pequot and Mohegan tribes—direct competitors in the casino business—must jump through to build a
third casino in the state.”).
27
2015 Conn. Acts 1484 (Spec. Sess.). The requirement that the tribal business entity be owned
exclusively by the Tribes comports with the federal legislation regarding tribal gaming. Under the
federal statute, an Indian tribe must maintain the sole proprietary interest in any gaming operation.
Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 2710(b)(2)(a), (d)(1)(ii) (2012) [hereinafter IGRA]; see
also COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 17, § 12.09, at 912 (“IGRA requires the Indian tribe to own any
Indian gaming operation and retain the ‘sole proprietary interest’ in the enterprise . . . . In other words,
a tribe is prohibited from alienating this valuable asset.”). See infra Part III.B for a further discussion of
the requirements of the federal statute.
28
CONN. SEC’Y OF STATE, BUSINESS INQUIRY: MMCT VENTURE, LLC (Aug. 24, 2015),
http://www.concord-sots.ct.gov/CONCORD/online?sn=PublicInquiry&eid=9740 [https://perma.cc/L3
BT-E8QH]. MMCT Venture’s registered principal officer, Kevin Brown, also serves as the chairman of
the Mohegan Tribal Council. See id. (listing Kevin Brown as manager of MMCT Venture, LLC);
Government: The Mohegan Tribal Council, MOHEGAN TRIBE (2015), http://www.mohegan.nsn.us/
government/government-structure/tribal-council [https://perma.cc/JP8D-Q57V]; see also Tribes Sign
Agreement on Third Connecticut Casino Location, WFSB-3 CONN. (Sept. 10, 2015), http://www.wfsb.
com/story/29998185/tribes-to-sign-agreement-on-third-connecticut-casino-location [https://perma.cc/
N3QL-JA2J] (detailing the signing of the partnership agreement between the two tribes at the capitol
building in Hartford, Connecticut on September 10, 2015).
29
The Connecticut Department of Consumer Protection listed the request on its website on
October 1, 2015. 2015 Conn. Acts 1484 (Spec. Sess.) (“The department [of Consumer protection] shall
post such requests for proposals on its Internet web site.”); MMCT Venture, LLC, Request for
Proposals, CONN. DEP’T OF CONSUMER PROTECTION (Oct. 1, 2015), http://www.ct.gov/dcp/lib/dcp/M
MCT_Request_for_Proposal.pdf [https://perma.cc/3SC6-22D6] (detailing MMCT’s request to
Connecticut towns for proposals to build the state’s third casino).
30
2015 Conn. Acts 1485 (Spec. Sess.) (“Any such development agreement shall be contingent
upon amendment to state law enacted by the General Assembly that provides for the operation of and
participation in a casino gaming facility by such tribal business entity.”). Under IGRA, existing state
law must already legalize gaming in order for any tribe to operate casinos on reservation land. 25
U.S.C. § 2701(5) (2012).
26
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31

Connecticut General Assembly sessions.
The current structure of Connecticut’s law raises serious implications
for its ability to comport with federal gaming requirements. First, the Act
states that its provisions “shall not be construed to authorize the formation
of more than one tribal business entity,”32 meaning only the Mashantucket
and Pequot tribes can open Connecticut’s third casino. Second,
Connecticut’s new law does not require the tribal business entity and the
state to enter into a tribal-state gaming compact, a provision required under
federal law for gaming on Indian lands.33 Lastly, as mentioned earlier, the
Act does not require that the proposed casino be located on tribal land of
either of the Tribes, another requirement listed under the federal statute.34
On July 22, 2015, MGM35 attempted to register a tribal business entity
with Connecticut’s Secretary of State, pursuant to the Act. MGM received
a prompt rejection on July 23, 2015, stating that its proposal did not
comply with the Act because MGM had no affiliation with either of
Connecticut’s tribes.36 MGM subsequently filed a lawsuit against
Connecticut’s Governor, Secretary of State, and the Commissioner of its
Department of Consumer Protection on August 4, 2015.
31

2015 Conn. Acts 1485 (Spec. Sess.).
Id.
33
In fact, in lieu of a “tribal-gaming compact”, the Act requires only that the Connecticut
legislature amend state law “to provide for the operation of and participation in” a third casino run by
the tribal business entity. 2015 Conn. Acts 1485 (Spec. Sess.). See infra Part II.A.1 for an explanation
of the compacts required between a tribe and a state under IGRA.
34
As noted above, the Act specifically states that the tribal business entity may review proposals
“regarding the establishment of a possible casino gaming facility in a municipality.” 2015 Conn. Acts
1484 (Spec. Sess.); see also Letter from George C. Jepsen, Attorney Gen., Office of the Attorney Gen.,
State of Conn., to Legislator Leadership, Conn. Gen. Assembly 2 (Apr. 15, 2015),
http://www.ctnewsjunkie.com/upload/2015/04/20150415_Legislator_Leadership_Letter.pdf
[https://
perma.cc/W8R4-SXA6] (“As we understand it, the proposed legislation would include the following
principal elements: The law would authorize the licensing of one or more casino gaming facilities to be
operated by some form of joint venture by the Tribes. The facilities would not be located on reservation
lands and would not involve the federal government taking any lands into trust for the Tribes.”).
35
MGM is registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission as a miscellaneous
amusement and recreation business. See MGM Resorts International Global Gaming Development,
LLC, WHALE WISDOM (2016), http://whalewisdom.com/filer/mgm-resorts-international-global-gaming
-development-llc#tabsummary_tab_link [https://perma.cc/2YF3-73P9] (providing MGM’s Securities
and Exchange Commission listing code). Per its website, MGM “develops, builds and operates unique
destination resorts designed to provide a total resort experience, including first-class accommodations
and dining, world-class entertainment, state-of-the-art meeting and convention facilities, and highquality retail and gaming experiences.” Company Overview, MGM RESORTS INT’L (2016),
http://www.mgmresorts.com/company/company-overview.aspx
[https://perma.cc/7ASX-9F89].
Moreover, MGM describes itself as “one of the world’s leading global hospitality companies, operating
a world-renowned portfolio of destination resort brands.” MGM Resorts International Global Gaming
Development, LLC, EDGAR ONLINE (Mar. 2, 2015), http://yahoo.brand.edgar-online.com/displayfiling
info.aspx?FilingID=10530371-9693499819&type=sect&TabIndex=2&companyid=877290&ppu=%25
2fdefault.aspx%253fcompanyid%253d877290 [https://perma.cc/ESS9-P7FV] (providing MGM’s
prospectus).
36
Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 11–12, supra note 7.
32
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At its core, MGM’s lawsuit alleges that the Act defies the United
States Constitution by violating the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment and the dormant commerce clause.37 MGM argues
that the Act has created a “race-based set-aside in favor of the two
Preferred Tribes at the expense of all other tribes, races, and entities[,]”38
and that the Connecticut legislature violated the Equal Protection Clause
by granting such preferential treatment to a racial group without
simultaneously advancing a compelling government interest to justify the
discriminatory treatment.39 MGM further alleges that the Connecticut
legislature has, in effect, created “an exclusive, no-bid process for the
Preferred Tribes” to present a proposal for an otherwise off-reservation,
commercial casino in the state.40 This exclusive, no-bid process has a
detrimental impact on non-tribal competitors, such as MGM, because it
denies them a fair opportunity to compete for the construction of
Connecticut’s third casino.41 MGM stated the “plain intent of the Act is
that an agreement be reached between the Preferred Tribes and a
municipality . . . with no opportunities for MGM or any other entities to
compete” and that it was “unlikely subsequent legislation would allow
MGM or other entities to compete for a Connecticut casino.”42 MGM
further contended that even if it were allowed to compete for the casino, it
would nonetheless be at a competitive disadvantage “given that the
Preferred Tribes would have already reached an agreement with a
municipality and have made other preparations to gain a preferred market
position.”43
37

Id. at 2. This paper will focus exclusively on discussions of equal protection violations. The
issues raised regarding dormant commerce clause violations will be discussed only briefly.
38
Id.
39
Id. at 13–14.
40
Id. at 2.
41
Id. at 12.
42
Id.
43
Id. MGM next alleges that the Act violates the dormant commerce clause of the Constitution.
Specifically, MGM alleges that Connecticut has unconstitutionally discriminated against interstate
commerce because the Act “prohibits all out-of-state entities, including MGM, from competing to
develop a Connecticut casino and reserves those development opportunities to the Connecticut-based
Preferred Tribes.” Id. at 15. MGM believes that Connecticut is also unable to “make any showing that
the Act is the only means available to advance a legitimate local interest,” thereby violating the
Constitution’s prohibition on states from adopting legislation that improperly burdens interstate
commerce. Id. On its face, MGM argues, the Act serves only to protect Connecticut’s local interest in
ensuring additional revenue flow to the Tribes from owning and operating the third casino. Id. at 16.
MGM notes, however, that presumably any out-of-state casino developer could provide similar tax,
employment, and other benefits to the state as what the Tribes could, arguing essentially that the Act’s
goal of ensuring an additional revenue flow to the Tribes is not a sufficient local interest to justify
discrimination against out-of-state competition. Id.
This argument is unlikely to prevail in federal court. As explained previously, IGRA
contemplates a revenue-sharing agreement between states and tribes, and one that can be designed to
enhance the economic benefits to the states. See COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 17, § 12.05[2], at
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In response to the defendants’ first motion to dismiss filed on
September 23, 2015,44 MGM filed an amended complaint on October 5,
2015.45 In its amended complaint, MGM highlighted various developments
that had occurred since the date of its original complaint.46 In particular,
MGM noted that since MMCT Venture’s request for proposals had been
posted on the Connecticut Department of Consumer Protection website,
towns in Connecticut “have taken steps to convince the Preferred Tribes to
engage in discussions with them about a casino development agreement.”47
Indeed, towns continue to vie for the opportunity to have a casino in their
jurisdiction, rather than on the Tribes’ reservations. As of September 28,
2015, the town of Enfield was considering a potential site for the casino at
the town’s aging Enfield Square Mall.48 As of October 2015, the towns of
East Windsor, East Hartford, and Windsor Locks also continued to discuss
submitting plans for consideration of the casino site.49 As MGM correctly
noted, the Tribes will clearly be building a casino outside of any federallyrecognized Indian land. The failure to locate the third casino on land
belonging to either Tribe may be a decisive factor in the district court’s

891 (“The Secretary of the Interior has approved revenue-sharing agreements on the ground that those
[revenue shares going to states] are not taxes, but exchanges of cash for significant economic value
conferred by the exclusive or substantially exclusive right to conduct gaming in the state.”).
44
See Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss at 2, 22–24, MGM
Resorts Int’l Glob. Gaming Dev., LLC v. Malloy, No. 3:15-cv-1182-AWT (D. Conn. Sept. 23, 2015)
(arguing the court should dismiss plaintiffs’ claims because (1) as MGM had not suffered a cognizable
and particularized injury, it did not have standing to sue; and (2) even if MGM could claim some
injury, its claims were not ripe for judicial review because MGM lacked such cognizable injury and the
issue would be better decided later, when any harm was no longer so speculative).
45
First Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, MGM Resorts Int’l Glob.
Gaming Dev., LLC v. Malloy, No. 3:15-cv-1182-AWT (D. Conn. Oct. 5, 2015).
46
See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra note 7.
47
First Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 18, supra note 45 (citations
omitted). MGM noted that East Hartford’s Planning and Zoning Commission approved a proposed
casino site on September 23, 2015. Id. (citations omitted).
48
See Mikaela Porter, Clock Ticking As Enfield Starts Talking Casinos In Earnest, HARTFORD
COURANT (Sept. 28, 2015), http://www.courant.com/news/connecticut/hc-northern-connecticutcasinos-20150928-story.html [https://perma.cc/WX9V-E576] (discussing Enfield’s considerations in
hosting a casino).
49
See Jordan Otero, East Hartford Casino Proposal Moves Forward, HARTFORD COURANT
(Sept. 24, 2015), http://www.courant.com/community/east-hartford/hc-east-hartford-showcase-cinemaspecial-permit-vote-20150924-story.html [https://perma.cc/PAD3-CJAT] (discussing East Hartford’s
consideration of hosting a casino); Porter, supra note 48 (reporting on Enfield); Matthew Sturdevant,
East Windsor Prepares for Possible Casino Proposal, HARTFORD COURANT (Apr. 25, 2015),
http://www.courant.com/business/hc-east-windsor-casino-referendum-20150424-story.html [https://per
ma.cc/4V63-RB3C] (reporting on East Windsor’s consideration of hosting a casino); Jeff Zalesin,
Conn. Town to Weigh Proposal for Tribal Airport Casino, LAW 360 (Oct. 20, 2015), http://www.law
360.com/articles/716490/conn-town-to-weigh-proposal-for-tribal-airport-casino [https://perma.cc/L5X
3-NLCX] (discussing Bradley Airport’s interest in establishing a casino site in the town of Windsor
Locks).
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III. CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
A. The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act51 and Mancari: States’ Roles in
Federally Authorized Tribal Gaming
Connecticut is not the first state to pass a law that grants preferential
treatment to Indian tribes to conduct gaming operations.52 Connecticut’s
law, however, is unique because it circumvents the traditional
understanding of Indian-state gaming relations that has developed since the
passage of the Indian Regulatory Gaming Act (“IGRA”) in 1988.53
Connecticut’s law represents a new breed of a state tribal-gaming
regimes—a breed that may finally tilt the balance in favor of a higher level
of judicial scrutiny when courts assess constitutional implications of equal
protection within the Indian-relations sphere.
B. The Federal Tribal Gaming Scheme
Congress passed IGRA to provide a statutory construction for the
operation and regulation of gaming by Indian tribes.54 Specifically,
Congress passed the law in an effort to promote cooperation between the
states and tribes in the wake of the Supreme Court’s decision in California
v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians.55 In Cabazon, the Court was asked to
determine the reach of a California law regulating vice activity and
prohibiting gaming with regard to ongoing bingo operations conducted by
federally-recognized tribes on reservation land.56 The Court found that
there was no express federal grant of power to the states to regulate gaming
50

As of February 9, 2016, MMCT Venture had not selected an off-reservation site for the location
of the third casino. Gosselin, supra note 19.
51
For purposes of this paper, IGRA will be discussed only in relation to its creation and
regulation of “Class III gaming”: gaming that is not regulated under Class I (“social games solely for
prizes of minimal value or traditional forms of Indian gaming . . . in connection with tribal ceremonies,
or celebrations”) or Class II gaming (bingo) but rather, those games traditionally seen at casinos such as
baccarat, black jack, slot machines, and electronic or electromechanical facsimiles of any game of
chance. 25 U.S.C. § 2703(6)–(8) (2012).
52
For example, state laws and constitutional amendments in California and Massachusetts have
reflected a preference for Indian gaming at the expense of non-Indian interests. See, e.g., CAL. CONST.
art. IV, § 19 (reflecting the Proposition 1A amendment); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 23k (2011) (referencing
the Massachusetts Gaming Act, although § 91 has not been codified).
53
See generally 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701–21 (2012).
54
25 U.S.C. § 2702(1) (2012) (“The purpose of this chapter is-(1) to provide a statutory basis for
the operation of gaming by Indian tribes as a means of promoting tribal economic development, selfsufficiency, and strong tribal governments.”); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 48 (1996)
(noting the same).
55
480 U.S. 202 (1987).
56
Id. at 204–06; see also Koenig & Stein, supra note 14, at 348.
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and held that the federal policy promoting tribal economic development
trumped California’s interest in controlling crime at the gaming sites.57
After this decision, states expressed a desire for greater involvement in
tribal gaming and, accordingly, IGRA now embodies the idea of
cooperative federalism as it balances the interests of both the federal and
state governments with Indian tribes.58
IGRA’s principal goal is to further establish federal policy of
“promot[ing] tribal economic development, tribal self-sufficiency, and
strong tribal government.”59 IGRA was designed to both preserve and
balance the tribal business that had developed through the casino gaming
industry on Indian lands, while still allowing states to retain some control
over the federal reservations within their borders. IGRA streamlines the
process for Indian tribes to become licensed to game within any state that
does not already prohibit such gaming activity and defines the parameters
of the competing sovereign interests involved in tribal gaming.
Additionally, IGRA also provides for and defines the federal
government’s regulatory role in tribal gaming. The law created the
National Indian Gaming Commission (“NIGC”), which is vested with
general oversight authority through the Secretary of the Interior.60 Among
the Secretary of the Interior’s key functions under IGRA is the duty to
approve or deny a “tribal-state compact.”61 A tribal-state compact is “a
specific agreement between the particular state and the tribe that describes
not only the type of games that the state will permit, but also the condition
under which the casinos may operate the games.”62 A tribal-state compact
is necessary in order for a state to permit a tribe to conduct Class III

57

Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 207–08, 216–22.
See, e.g., Artichoke Joe’s Cal. Grand Casino v. Norton, 216 F. Supp. 2d 1084, 1092 (E.D. Cal.
2002) (“IGRA is an example of ‘cooperative federalism’ in that it seeks to balance the competing
sovereign interests of the federal government, state governments, and Indian tribes, by giving each a
role in the regulatory scheme.”).
59
25 U.S.C. § 2701(4) (2012); William Bennett Cooper III, What’s in the Cards for the Future of
Indian Gaming Law?, 5 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 129, 131 (1998) (“As stated in the first section of
IGRA, the purpose of the statute is to promote tribal economic development and simultaneous selfsufficiency.”); Caitlin E. Flanagan, The Need for Compromise: Introducing Indian Gaming and
Commercial Casinos to Massachusetts, 42 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 179, 188 (2008) (“Congress and tribes
believe that Indian gaming will promote self-determination by making tribes economically independent
and providing the means to address chronic issues affecting many tribes such as poverty, poor health,
and substance abuse.”).
60
25 U.S.C. § 2704 (2012); see also Mission, Principles and Priorities, NAT’L INDIAN GAMING
COMM’N,
http://www.nigc.gov/commission/mission-and-responsibilities
[https://perma.cc/5R996HMZ] (last visited Apr. 23, 2016) (stating that the mission of the NIGC is “[r]egulating Indian gaming
to promote tribal economic development, self-sufficiency and strong tribal governments . . . and to
ensure that tribes are the primary beneficiaries of their gaming activities.”).
61
25 U.S.C. § 2705(a)(3) (2012).
62
Cooper, supra note 59, at 135.
58
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63

gaming within its jurisdiction. The statute, therefore, facilitates state and
tribal control over gaming falling exclusively on tribal land through the
compacting process while retaining power in the federal government to
ensure the law itself is not violated.64
In addition to the tribal-state compact requirement, IGRA contemplates
other specifications for tribal gaming. First, IGRA requires that Indian
gaming be conducted on Indian lands.65 The term “Indian lands” as defined
in the statute means:
(A) all lands within the limits of any Indian reservation; and
(B) any lands title to which is either held in trust by the
United States for the benefit of any Indian tribe or individual
or held by any Indian tribe or individual subject to restriction
by the United States against alienation and over which an
Indian tribe exercises governmental power.66
IGRA’s terms, therefore, have limited the establishment of Class III
gaming to land that is either held in trust or subject to a restriction by the
federal government, or on federally-supervised Indian reservation land.67
Second, the statute permits the state and tribe to enter into revenue-sharing
agreements, which most often grant the tribe the exclusive right to game in
a state in exchange for cash.68 The Secretary of the Interior has mandated
that revenues from gaming may be used by a state “so long as the
25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1)(A) (2012); see also COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 17, § 12.02[1], at
876 (noting that Class III games “can only be conducted pursuant to tribal-state compacts approved by
the Secretary of the Interior”).
64
Cooper, supra note 59, at 135–36. IGRA also provides for three requirements that must be met
to allow Class III gaming: Class III gaming shall be lawful only on Indian lands only if such activities
are authorized by a tribal-state compact, are located in a state that permits such gaming for any purpose
by any person or organization, and are conducted in conformance with the tribal-state compact entered
into by the Indian tribe and the state. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1).
65
25 U.S.C. § 2703(4)(A)–(B) (2012); COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 17, § 12.02[1], at 876–
77 (explaining that tribal gaming is permitted only on Indian lands); see also The Commission: FAQs,
NAT’L INDIAN GAMING COMM’N, http://www.nigc.gov/commission/faqs [https://perma.cc/49GHMQFK] (last visited April 23, 2016) (“IGRA requires that Indian gaming occur on Indian lands. Indian
lands include land within the boundaries of a reservation as well as land held in trust or restricted status
by the United States on behalf of a tribe . . . over which a tribe has jurisdiction and exercises
governmental power.”). Cohen’s Handbook explains that when “[o]ff-reservation, however, whether on
traditional trust land or on land not held in trust but subject to a restriction against alienation, a tribe
may engage in gaming only if it exercises governmental authority over the off-reservation land.”
COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 17, § 12.04[1], at 885 (citations omitted). See generally id. §
12.04[1]–[2], at 885-87 (discussing off-reservation land).
66
25 U.S.C. § 2703(4)(A)–(B) (2012).
67
See Koenig & Stein, supra note 14, at 352–53 (explaining the definitions of “Indian land” and
“Indian reservation” as understood under IGRA).
68
See supra Part I (discussing revenue-sharing agreements further); COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra
note 17, §12.05[2], at 891 (“These arrangements are known as ‘exclusivity provisions’ and have
become increasingly prevalent.” (citations omitted)).
63
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exclusivity provides ‘substantial economic benefit’ to the tribe.” Lastly,
the tribes must use gaming-generated funds for “specific purposes.”70 A
state can show it has complied with IGRA when it negotiates with a tribe
to meet each of these requirements.
69

C. Supreme Court Precedent: Morton v. Mancari
Connecticut’s recently enacted law and the potential outcome of the
MGM litigation can be analyzed by comparison to the results of
constitutional challenges to similar statutes and initiatives adopted in
California and Massachusetts. Under the guidance of Supreme Court
precedent regarding federal legislation with Indian tribes, circuit courts
have so far upheld the constitutionality of state laws favoring Indian
gaming.
The Supreme Court first heard constitutional due process and equal
protection challenges to a federal law that allegedly discriminated on the
basis of race in favor of Indians in 1974.71 In Morton v. Mancari, the Court
found that an employment policy of preferring qualified Indians at the
Bureau of Indian Affairs was consistent with federal Indian policy and
Congress’ obligation to give Indians “greater participation in their own
self-government” and in furthering the “[g]overnment’s trust obligation
toward the Indian tribes.”72 The Court expounded on the special
relationship between the federal government and the Indian tribes,
highlighting the fact that “[l]iterally every piece of legislation dealing with
the Indian tribes and reservations . . . single out for special treatment a
constituency of tribal Indians living on or near reservations.”73 The Court
determined that in light of this “historical and legal context,”74 the
preferential treatment of Indians was “not directed towards a ‘racial’ group
consisting of ‘Indians’; instead, it applie[d] only to members of ‘federally
recognized’ tribes . . . exclud[ing] many individuals who are racially to be
classified as ‘Indians.’”75 Essentially, the Court held that, in the context of
due process concerns, the Indian preference was “political rather than
COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 17, § 12.05[3], at 893 (citations omitted).
Moreover, revenue produced by Class III gaming and retained solely by tribes must be used for
a specific purpose. 25 U.S.C. §§ 2710(b)(2), (d)(1)(a)(ii) (2012) (mandating that net revenues from
tribal gaming shall not be used for purposes other than funding tribal government operations and
programs, providing for the general welfare of tribes, promoting tribal economic development,
charitable donations, and funding local government operations).
71
Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974).
72
Id. at 541–42 (citations omitted). The Court went on to say that “[t]he overriding purpose of
[the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934] was to establish machinery whereby Indian tribes would be
able to assume a greater degree of self-government, both politically and economically.” Id. at 542.
73
Id. at 552.
74
Id. at 553.
75
Id. at 553 n.24.
69
70
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racial in nature.” In an oft-cited passage from the case, the Court
articulated its test as to whether a preferential Indian law could survive a
due process challenge:
76

As long as the special treatment can be tied rationally to the
fulfillment of Congress’ unique obligation toward the
Indians, such legislative judgments will not be disturbed.
Here, where the preference is reasonable and rationally
designed to further Indian self-government, we cannot say
that Congress’ classification violates due process.77
The employment preference at the BIA was found to benefit Indian tribes
because it gave greater control to Indians over their “destinies”78 and
fulfilled the institutional change needed in Indian affairs to “further the
cause of Indian self-government and to make the BIA more responsive to
the needs of its constituent groups.”79 Thus, because the employment
preference was reasonable and rationally designed to further Indian selfgovernment—and therefore Congress’ unique obligation to Indians—it did
not violate the guarantee of equal protection of the laws.80 Furthermore,
because the preference was granted to a tribe as a whole, preferential
treatment was not directed at a race or a national origin.81 Therefore, under
Mancari, federal laws identifying Indians along tribal lines need only
survive a rational-basis review—again, the less exacting standard of
judicial scrutiny.
Five years later, the Court addressed the issue of whether a preferential
Indian state law could survive due process challenges. In Washington v.
Confederated Bands and Tribes of the Yakima Indian Nation, the Court
described the circumstance in which the rational-basis review test
established in Mancari applied to state laws that were preferential to
Indians.82 The state of Washington had enacted a law asserting partial civil
and criminal jurisdiction over Indian lands pursuant to a grant of authority
from Congress.83 The Yakima Indian Nation contended that the state law,
76

Id.
Id. at 555. Since Mancari, the scope of the Court’s preferential treatment rationale has extended
outside the context of Indian self-government and employment preferences. For example, in United
States v. Antelope, the Court applied its preferential-treatment test to a criminal law and reaffirmed the
idea that tribal members are treated not as a discrete racial group but as members of quasi-sovereign
tribal entities. 430 U.S. 641, 645 (1977). See generally Smith & Mayhew, supra note 23, at 49–50
(discussing the implications of the Antelope decision and other decisions extending the Mancari
rationale beyond Indian self-government).
78
Mancari, 417 U.S. at 553.
79
Id. at 554.
80
Id. at 555.
81
Id. at 554.
82
439 U.S. 463, 481–483 (1979).
83
Id. at 481.
77
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even if authorized by Congress, nonetheless violated the equal protection
and due process guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment.84 Emphasizing
its holding in Mancari, the Court noted that while “[i]t is settled that ‘the
unique legal status of Indian tribes under federal law’ permits the Federal
Government to enact legislation singling out tribal Indians,” states did not
enjoy the “same unique relationship” with Indian tribes.85 Despite this
apparent deficiency, however, the Court went on to explain that
Washington’s law was “not simply another state law.”86 Rather, the law
was “enacted in response to a federal measure explicitly designed to
readjust the allocation of jurisdiction over Indians,” and that jurisdiction
under the state law stemmed directly from the federal law.87 In light of this
presumed correlation between the federal and state laws, the Court applied
rational-basis review to Washington’s law as if it were federal and
sustained the preferential treatment.88 The key provision—that the state
law was enacted in response to a federal goal—has since been employed to
validate state laws granting explicit preference to Indians or distinguishing
Indian tribes in constitutional equal protection challenges.89
The Court has repeatedly affirmed that Mancari is the proper test to
use when scrutinizing federal Indian legislation in the equal protection
context.90 The Court, however, has not heard a case regarding the Equal
Protection Clause in the context of tribal gaming and IGRA. Absent
Supreme Court authority, circuit and state courts have grappled with
funneling Mancari through Yakima when presented with preferential state
tribal gaming laws. Questions have arisen regarding the scope of
“Congress’ unique obligations” towards Indian tribes and the
corresponding reach of Mancari—particularly whether grants of exclusive,
monopolistic gaming rights to Indians actually fulfill those “obligations.”91
Two recent circuit court decisions in the wake of Mancari and Yakima
have reluctantly applied the tests articulated by the Court to decide
constitutional challenges to states’ preferential treatment of Indian tribes in
the gaming context.

84

Id. at 500.
Id. at 500–01.
86
Id. at 501.
87
Id. (“In enacting [state law] Chapter 36, Washington was legislating under explicit authority
granted by Congress in exercise of that federal power.” (emphasis added)).
88
Id. at 500–01.
89
The Court explained how the state law furthered both Washington’s and the federal
government’s interests as follows: “Chapter 36 is fairly calculated to further the State’s interest in
providing protection to non-Indian citizens living within the boundaries of a reservation while at the
same time allowing scope for tribal self-government on trust or restricted lands.” Id. at 502.
90
See Smith & Mayhew, supra note 23, at 49–50.
91
Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 555 (1974).
85
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D. Circuit Court Application of and Skepticism Toward Mancari
1. Ninth Circuit: Artichoke Joe’s California Grand Casino v. Norton
Various California card clubs and charities that were prohibited under
California state law from offering Class III gaming brought an action
challenging the validity of California’s tribal-state compacts allowing only
in-state tribes to engage in Class III gaming. 92 After voter ratification of
Proposition 1A in March 2000, the California Constitution was amended to
allow the governor to negotiate compacts with tribes, subject to state
legislative approval, for the operation of slot machines and lottery games
on Indian land.93 However, “[b]ecause the California Constitution
otherwise banned the same casino-style games that the amendment allowed
for Indian tribes, the result was a tribal monopoly on class III gaming in
California.”94 The plaintiffs, non-Indians who were then conducting
gaming operations within the regulations of the state constitution, sought
declaratory and injunctive relief claiming that the monopoly violated
IGRA and equal protection guarantees.95 After first finding that
Proposition 1A permitted Class III gaming in the state96 and that IGRA
allowed California to grant a monopoly to their Indian tribes over Class III
gaming,97 the Ninth Circuit held Proposition 1A and the tribal-state
compacts did not violate the plaintiffs’ rights to equal protection of the
laws.98
Pursuant to Mancari, the Ninth Circuit first reasoned that the
distinction between Indian and non-Indian gaming interests was a political
distinction rather than a racial one.99 The court found that the express terms
of IGRA (the exclusive right for an Indian tribe, not individual, to enter
into gaming compacts) and the inherent nature of the tribal-state compact
resembled an agreement between two sovereign nations, thereby
solidifying the classification as political.100 The court then found IGRA
Artichoke Joe’s Cal. Grand Casino v. Norton, 353 F.3d 712, 714 (9th Cir. 2003).
Id. at 717–18.
94
Smith & Mayhew, supra note 23, at 51.
95
Artichoke Joe’s, 353 F.3d at 718.
96
Id. at 721 (“Proposition 1A does more than authorize the Governor to enter into Tribal-State
compacts. It explicitly states that ‘slot machines, lottery games, and banking and percentage card
games are hereby permitted to be conducted and operated on tribal lands’ subject to the regulations
embodied in the Tribal-State compact. Thus, there is law—separate from the compact itself—that
‘permits such gaming’ in certain circumstances.” (emphasis in original) (citations omitted)).
97
Id. at 731.
98
Id. at 742.
99
Id. at 734 (citing Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 553 n.24 (1974)).
100
Id. The court went on to state that:
92
93

Further, through IGRA’s compacting process, and through its reliance on tribal
governments and tribal ordinances to regulate class III gaming, the statute relates to
tribal status and tribal self-government. The very nature of a Tribal-State compact is
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authorized gaming only on Indian lands and noted that this was a critical
limitation in the federal statute “given the well-established connection
between tribal lands and tribal sovereignty.”101 The court emphasized that
IGRA centered on the importance of permitting special activities on Indian
land as a means of furthering tribal sovereignty.102 As promoting selfsufficiency and self-government was part of Congress’ unique obligation
towards Indians, the preferential state constitutional amendment was
validated.103
Having concluded that IGRA satisfied Mancari, the court next applied
Yakima to Proposition 1A and found that the state amendment was enacted
in response to IGRA because “the people of California were legislating
with reference to the authority that Congress had granted to the State of
California in IGRA.”104 Specifically, because Proposition 1A was designed
to readjust state and Indian regulatory authority over Class III gaming on
Indian land, it “echo[ed]” the requirements of IGRA.105 Since Proposition
1A furthered Congress’ obligation to tribes and satisfied Yakima, the Ninth
Circuit applied rational-basis review and found that (1) IGRA and the
California tribal-state compacts were rationally related to the federal
government’s interest in furthering tribal self-government;106 and (2) that
Proposition 1A, despite granting a monopoly to the state’s tribes, served a
legitimate state interest in regulating a vice activity and promoting
cooperation between the tribes and the state.”107 Thus, in an early
application of Mancari to the tribal gaming context, the Ninth Circuit
found that a state provision granting exclusive gaming rights to Indians did
not violate equal protection.
2. First Circuit: KG Urban Enterprises, LLC v. Patrick
Nine years later, the First Circuit heard a similar equal protection
challenge to a then-recently enacted Massachusetts law in KG Urban
Enterprises, LLC v. Patrick.108 Under Section 91 of the Massachusetts
Gaming Act, Massachusetts’s governor could enter into a compact with a
federally-recognized tribe in the commonwealth that “has purchased, or
political; it is an agreement between an Indian tribe, as one sovereign, and a state, as
another.
Id.
Id. at 735. (“Under IGRA, for example, individual Indians (or even Indian tribes) could not
establish a class III gaming establishment on non-Indian lands.”).
102
Id.
103
Id.
104
Id. at 736.
105
Id. See also supra Part III.B for a discussion of the requirements of IGRA.
106
Artichoke Joe’s, 353 F.3d at 736.
107
Id. at 737.
108
KG Urban Enterprises, LLC v. Patrick (KG Urban II), 693 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2012).
101
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entered into an agreement to purchase, a parcel of land for the proposed
tribal gaming development.”109 Section 91 further provided that the
commonwealth’s gaming commission would entertain non-tribal proposals
only after it was clear that a compact could not first be reached between the
governor and the commonwealth’s tribes, or if it was clear the tribes would
not have land on which to operate casinos.110 Although Section 91 did not
by its literal terms preclude non-tribal gaming, it nonetheless did so if a
tribal-state compact was approved, regardless of whether any of
Massachusetts’s tribes had federal Indian land.111 The plaintiff, KG Urban
Enterprises, LLC (“KG”), an equity development company, had invested
over $4.6 million in preparing to convert a brownfield site into a multi-use
property including a gaming facility.112 KG argued that because neither of
Massachusetts’ federally-recognized tribes possessed any land, tribal
gaming could not be authorized under IGRA,113 and therefore the tribalstate compact unreasonably harmed KG’s ability to obtain a gaming
license.114
An examination of the first decision in this litigation by a district court
in Massachusetts, although overturned by the First Circuit on appeal,
provides insight into judicial frustration with the application of the
Mancari doctrine in the tribal-gaming context.115 Although the district
judge dismissed KG’s complaint—finding Massachusetts’s gaming scheme
was authorized by IGRA116 and that, pursuant to Yakima, a state law
consistent with federal legislation is reviewed under the rational-basis
standard117—the court nonetheless opined that Mancari “makes an
artificial distinction which undermines the constitutional requirement of
race neutrality.”118 Essentially, the court took issue with what could truly
be considered as a “unique obligation” owed to Indians in order to trigger
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 23k § 91(c) (2011). “The compact repeatedly refers to the tribe’s
‘exclusive’ rights to conduct gaming in Region C if the compact receives legislative approval by July
31, 2012.” KG Urban II, 693 F.3d at 6.
110
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 23k § 91(e) (2011). At the time of the litigation, Massachusetts’s two
federally-recognized tribes did not own any federal reservation land within the commonwealth. KG
Urban II, 693 F.3d at 11–12. The Mashpee Wampanoag Tribe had submitted a tribal-state compact to
the Secretary of Interior, reflecting an application to take federal lands into its trust. Id. at 12.
111
KG Urban II, 693 F.3d at 6.
112
Id. at 11.
113
Specifically, KG argued that “since the Secretary has not (and most likely cannot under present
law) authorize a Mashpee-Massachusetts gaming compact under IGRA, the state has excluded KG
from entering the gaming market and given the Mashpee a preference unlimited in duration.” Id. at 12.
114
Id.
115
KG Urban Enters., LLC v. Patrick (KG Urban I), 839 F. Supp. 2d 388 (D. Mass. 2012), aff’d
in part, vacated in part, KG Urban II, 693 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2012); see also Smith & Mayhew, supra
note 23, at 54 (discussing the district court’s first opinion in the litigation).
116
KG Urban I, 839 F. Supp. 2d at 407.
117
Id. at 404–05.
118
Id. at 407.
109
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rational-basis review and allow the state law to stand. The court suggested
that a monopoly over in-state gaming might not qualify as a unique
obligation towards Indians. The court stated:
If this Court were addressing the issue as one of first
impression, it would treat Indian tribal status as a quasipolitical, quasi-racial classification subject to varying levels
of scrutiny depending on the authority making it and the
interests at stake. Federal laws relating to native land, tribal
status or Indian culture would require minimal review
because such laws fall squarely within the historical and
constitutional authority of Congress to regulate core Indian
affairs. Laws granting gratuitous Indian preferences divorced
from those interests, such as . . . a law granting tribes a quasimonopoly on casino gaming, would be subject to more
searching scrutiny.119
Clearly, the district court did not think an exclusive right to game was part
of Congress’ obligation to Indians.
Massachusetts appealed the decision dismissing its complaint, arguing
that even if the Commonwealth’s classification was racial in nature, it was
nonetheless authorized by IGRA and subject to rational-basis review under
Yakima.120 Interestingly, Paul Clement, the nationally-known attorney and
former solicitor general under President George W. Bush, represented KG
in the appeal.121 Attorney Clement, at least once considered a top contender
for a Republican nomination to the Supreme Court, has been involved in
other cases advocating for an overhaul of Mancari.122 In reversing the
decision of the district court, the First Circuit started with the premise that
119

Id. at 404.
KG Urban II, 693 F.3d at 17.
121
Id. at 3; see also Jason Zengerle, The Paul Clement Court, N.Y. MAG. (Mar. 18, 2012),
http://nymag.com/news/features/paul-clement-2012-3/ [https://perma.cc/9YVN-TVU8] (noting that
Paul Clement was the solicitor general under the Bush administration, and that “since leaving the
position of solicitor general under Bush, [Clement] has become, in the Obama age, a sort of antisolicitor general—the go-to lawyer for some of the Republican Party’s most significant, and polarizing,
legal causes.”).
122
See Camila Domonske, Who Are the Possible Candidates to Fill Scalia’s Seat?, NPR (Feb. 17,
2016), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2016/02/14/466725863/who-are-the-possible-candidate
s-to-fill-scalias-seat [https://perma.cc/267W-V2KT] (reporting that Paul Clement remained on the short
list of likely Republican nominations for a Supreme Court vacancy); Jeffrey Toobin, The Supreme
Court Farm Team, NEW YORKER (Mar. 17, 2014), http://www.newyorker.com/news/dailycomment/the-supreme-court-farm-team [https://perma.cc/8FSJ-6G9A] (reporting that former solicitor
general Paul Clement was a contender for a Republican nomination to the Supreme Court).
Paul Clement was counsel for the guardian ad litem before the Supreme Court in Adoptive Couple
v. Baby Girl, a case that argued, in part, to overturn Mancari. See infra Part IV.B and accompanying
footnotes for a discussion of the litigious attack on Mancari. Paul Clement may have a role in the
MGM litigation, if the case proceeds to the appellate level.
120
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IGRA “limits the conditions under which tribes are allowed to enter into
gaming”123 and that, pursuant to IGRA, tribal gaming may only be
conducted by an Indian tribe on Indian lands.124 The court, however,
expressed doubts that Mancari could be extended to apply to preferential
state classifications and noted the differences between the two cases: that
Mancari involved several sources of federal authority—including the
commerce clause, treaty power, and a special trust—and the Massachusetts
law only dealt “with [the] establishment of gaming facilities and not
employment of Indians within agencies whose mission is to assist
Indians.”125 The court chided Massachusetts for failing to provide legal
authority that state classifications based on tribal status not authorized by
federal law nonetheless could qualify as political classifications.126 The
cases that Massachusetts did rely on—Yakima included—upheld those
state laws that were explicitly authorized by federal law; laws that were
“not like this case,” according to the court.127
The First Circuit then voiced its doubts that a tribal-state compact
negotiated under Section 91 would even be authorized by IGRA. 128 The
court stated that:
It would be difficult to conclude that the IGRA “authorizes”
the Massachusetts statute under these circumstances—where
there are no Indian lands . . . within the meaning of the
IGRA. Further, [Supreme Court precedent] may in the end
prohibit the Secretary from taking the Mashpee lands into
trust and so making them Indian lands, a question not yet
resolved.129

123

KG Urban II, 693 F.3d at 7.
Id. at 8.
125
Id. at 19; see also Smith & Mayhew, supra note 23, at 54 (“The First Circuit’s reading of
Mancari focuses on that opinion’s discussion of the relationship between tribes and the federal
government, and less on the political/racial distinction, which is based not only on the federal
relationship but also on the independent status of tribes as semi-sovereigns.”).
126
KG Urban II, 693 F.3d at 19 (“The defendants cite no authority holding that state preferential
classifications based on tribal status which are not authorized by federal law are nonetheless not racial
classifications under Mancari.”).
127
The court noted that instead, Massachusetts cited “a number of cases upholding state laws,
which are not like this case, said to be authorized by federal law under the rational of Yakima . . . see
Artichoke Joe’s Cal. Grand Casino v. Norton, 353 F.3d 712, 736 (9th Cir. 2003), U.S. v. Garrett, 122
Fed. Appx. 628, 631-33 (4th Cir. 2005), Squaxin Island Tribe v. Washington, 781 F.2d 715, 722 n.10
(9th Cir. 1986), Greene v. Comm’r of Minn. Dep’t of Human Servs., 755 N.W.2d 713, 727 (Minn.
2008), N.Y. Ass’n of Convenience Stores v. Urbach, 699 N.E.2d 904, 908 (1998)).” Id. at 19–20.
128
Id. at 20 (“We turn next to the defendants’ argument that nevertheless the state may still make
the classification, because § 91 is authorized by the IGRA under Yakima. In the present posture of this
case, that too is quite doubtful.”).
129
Id. at 21 (“KG does not dispute that if a federally recognized tribe in Massachusetts currently
possessed ‘Indian lands’ within the meaning of the IGRA, § 91 would fall sufficiently within the scope
124
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It was with this trepidation that the First Circuit ultimately found that KG’s
complaint should not have been dismissed because the issue still existed
whether the state scheme was authorized by IGRA and therefore fell within
Yakima, triggering rational-basis review.130 The First Circuit was not
convinced that Massachusetts’s gaming law was authorized by IGRA, but
left the question open on remand.131
The First and Ninth Circuits each concluded that the respective states’
preferential treatment of Indians correlated closely enough with IGRA to
not violate constitutional guarantees of equal protection. In regards to tribal
gaming, the decisions thus reflect two routes a court can take. First, a court
can require that a state law be specifically authorized by IGRA, as was
found in Artichoke Joe’s, to qualify for rational-basis review.132
Conversely, a court can require that the state law not be explicitly
authorized by IGRA, but rather merely implement or reflect IGRA, as the
First Circuit indicated in KG Urban.133 As noted previously, Connecticut’s

of the IGRA’s authorization and thus be subject to only rational basis review.”) (internal citations
omitted).
130
Id. at 24. The First Circuit found that IGRA applied only to gaming on Indian lands, but with
no such “Indian lands” held by the tribe in question, it was therefore doubtful IGRA could apply. Id.
(“In sum, whether § 91 is ‘authorized’ by the IGRA such that it falls within Yakima and is subject to
only rational basis review is far from clear, presents a difficult question of statutory interpretation, and
implicates a practice of the Secretary of the Interior not challenged in the suit.”).
131
Id. at 27. On remand, the district court upheld the constitutionality of the state gaming law on
summary judgment. KG Urban Enters., LLC v. Patrick (KG Urban III), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2437,
at *12 (D. Mass. Jan. 9, 2014). The court, however, again noted its skepticism (as it had in its first
opinion) that “this constitutional framework faithfully reflects the text and purpose of the Equal
Protection Clause.” Id. at *4 (citations omitted). The district court went on to say that “acting upon
such misgivings is not within the purview of a United States District Judge. The Supreme Court may
choose to exercise its institutional prerogative to revisit questionable precedent but until then this Court
is constrained.” Id.
The district court found that although the Massachusetts Gaming Act was not fully authorized by
IGRA, it could be considered a “parallel mechanism” to IGRA and therefore warranted rational-basis
review for a limited period, while the Mashpee awaited its fate to see if its lands were taken into trust.
Id. at 4 (citations omitted). The court reiterated the warnings of the First Circuit; namely, that if the
Mashpee tribe were explicitly foreclosed from taking land into trust by the federal government, then
KG Urban would prevail in the case, because the facts wouldn’t be authorized by IGRA then. Id. at 5.
Ultimately, the court determined the eighteen-month delay while awaiting approval from the Secretary
of the Interior did not violate the Constitution. Id. at 6.
132
Artichoke Joe’s Cal. Grand Casino v. Norton, 353 F.3d 712 (9th Cir. 2003); see also COHEN’S
HANDBOOK, supra note 17, § 14.03[2][b], at 960 (“Some courts have concluded that unless a state law
embodying an Indian classification is specifically authorized by a federal statute or treaty, it should not
benefit from the more relaxed standard of review found in Morton v. Mancari.”).
133
In KG Urban II, the First Circuit noted that, “[i]f the Secretary is willing under the IGRA to
approve a tribal-state compact contingent on the relevant land being acquired in trust, then the
Commonwealth can argue that § 91 establishes a parallel mechanism, meant to facilitate the purposes
of the IGRA, even if not precisely authorized by the IGRA, for a limited period of time.” KG Urban II,
693 F.3d at 25 (emphasis added); see also COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 17, § 14.03[2][b], at 960–
61 (“Others have taken a broader view, asserting that state laws may be reviewed under the more
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law does not comport with IGRA, and therefore, may not be specifically
authorized by the statute. The issue that Connecticut’s law raises, then, is
what the contours of an IGRA reflection look like and if Connecticut’s law
comes close enough to matching those guidelines.
IV. THE FUTURE OF MANCARI
A. United States District Court for the District of Connecticut: MGM’s
Pending Litigation
Since the Supreme Court has yet to establish the proper constitutional
analysis for state laws granting preferential treatment to Indians for tribal
gaming, it is probable that the Connecticut district court will follow the
reasoning employed by the circuit courts. According to the Ninth Circuit’s
holding in Artichoke Joe’s, an analysis of a preferential state law for tribal
gaming proceeds under both the Mancari and Yakima frameworks. Under
Mancari, the state law must first designate an Indian tribe not along
individual, racial determinations, but along tribal lines to establish its
classification as political. Next, the state law must be enacted in response
to the federal Indian regulatory framework; that is, the state law must be
enacted in furtherance of a federal measure that advances Congress’
obligation to Indians. Only after these first two requirements are met can a
district court apply the less demanding rational-basis review in determining
the state statute’s constitutionality.
Connecticut’s law differs significantly from the state laws reviewed by
the First and Ninth circuits. In Artichoke Joe’s, the case concerned Class
III gaming operations that were located on Indian reservations or Indian
trust lands134 and tribal-state compacts had been approved three years prior
to the litigation.135 The court found that the state legislation at issue,
Proposition 1A, had been ratified by the people of California “with
reference to the authority that Congress had granted to the State of
California in IGRA[,]” thereby associating the law with IGRA and
qualifying the law for rational-basis review.136 Likewise, the litigation in
KG Urban II centered on the Mashpee tribal-state compact between
Massachusetts and the Mashpee Wampanoag, thereby aligning the state
law with IGRA.137 Although the First Circuit was skeptical because of the
relaxed standard as long as they operate to implement, reflect, or effectuate federal laws, thereby
fulfilling Congress’s evidence intent to benefit Indians.”).
134
Artichoke Joe’s Cal. Grand Casino, 353 F.3d at 735 n.16.
135
See id. at 717 (discussing the tribal-state compacts negotiated by former California state
Governor Gray Davis and approved by the Assistant Secretary of Indian Affairs).
136
Id. at 736.
137
KG Urban II, 693 F.3d at 6 (describing the tribal-state compact underlying the instant
litigation).
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Mashpee’s lack of federally-recognized Indian land, the court nonetheless
reinstated the plaintiffs’ complaint. Contrarily, Connecticut’s new law
contains no reference to previously-established tribal-state compacts
between Connecticut and the Tribes, or to Class III gaming on the Tribes’
reservation land.138
Opponents of the Act may posit that it is conceivable that the district
court will find that the Act fails the Yakima framework, since it is arguable
that the Act does not reflect the federal Indian regulatory framework. 139
They will argue that first and foremost, Connecticut has already
established the parameters of how its state legislation over tribal gaming
would comport with IGRA. Connecticut has adopted two tribal-state
compacts with its federally-recognized tribes, which have governed the
state’s two casinos for over twenty years.140 If Connecticut wanted to
continue in its tribal gaming framework, the Act surely would have
contemplated a role within the two existing tribal-state compacts or at least
an extension of them as they now exist. However, the Act contains no
mention of the existing tribal-state compacts and grants only a new,
exclusive right to the two tribes to form a “tribal business entity.”141
Opponents may further argue that even if it is assumed that the Act is in
fact a state policy that “reflect[s]”142 the federal regulatory framework, the
Act does not contain any express provisions subjecting the new tribal
entity to the provisions of IGRA. As mentioned previously, IGRA requires
a state and tribe to enter into a gaming compact governing the conduct of
gaming on reservation land,143 but the Act is silent regarding a requirement

138
In fact, as Senator Fasano noted in session hearings before the Connecticut General Assembly,
the Act is “in contradiction of the compact” because it contemplates a third casino located off-site from
the Tribes’ reservation land. Memorandum in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Amended
Complaint, Exhibit 6, at 4, MGM Resorts Int’l Global Gaming Dev., LLC v. Malloy, No. 3:15-cv1182-AWT (D. Conn. Oct. 29, 2015); see also Mohegan Tribe-State of Connecticut Gaming Compact,
59 Fed. Reg. 241 (Dec. 16, 1994) (detailing the conduct and operations of casino gaming as specifically
located on the Mohegan reservation in Uncasville, Connecticut); Tribal-State Compact Between the
Mashantucket Pequot Tribe and the State of Connection, 56 Fed. Reg. 105 (May 31, 1991) (detailing
the conduct and operations of casino gaming on the Pequot reservation in Mashantucket, Connecticut).
139
The New York Court of Appeals described the reflection stating: “[W]hile States do not enjoy
th[e] same unique relationship, they may adopt laws and policies to reflect or effectuate Federal laws
designed ‘to readjust the allocation of jurisdiction over Indians,’ without opening themselves to the
charge that they have engaged in race-based discrimination.” N.Y. Ass’n of Convenience Stores v.
Urbach, 699 N.E.2d 904, 908 (N.Y. 1998) (citations omitted).
140
See Mohegan Tribe-State of Connecticut Gaming Compact, 59 Fed. Reg. 241 (Dec. 16, 1994)
(detailing the conduct and operations of casino gaming on the Mohegan reservation in Uncasville,
Connecticut); Tribal-State Compact Between the Mashantucket Pequot Tribe and the State of
Connecticut, 56 Fed. Reg. 105 (May 31, 1991) (detailing the conduct and operations of casino gaming
on the Pequot reservation in Mashantucket, Connecticut).
141
2015 Conn. Acts 1484 (Spec. Sess.).
142
Urbach, 699 N.E. 2d at 908.
143
See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d) (2012) (listing the requirements for a tribal-state compact).
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for Connecticut and MMCT Venture to enter into any such compact.144
Moreover, the Act does not require that Connecticut’s third casino be
located on reservation land. Unlike the legislation at issue in Artichoke
Joe’s and KG Urban, the Act remains completely open-ended about where
the new casino would be located and as seen from media accounts, towns
and municipalities across the state have initiated steps to submit site
proposals to MMCT Venture.145 This blatant lack of federally-recognized
Indian land certainly recalls the uncertainty the First Circuit had over
whether the tribe in KG Urban would obtain such land.146 Without
adhering to the basic requirements of IGRA, it is plausible that the
Connecticut district court will not uphold the legislation as a state
regulation furthering the goals of Congress’ relationship with Indians.147
Proponents of preferential treatment for Indians may counter that
Connecticut’s law is constitutional even though it is not specifically
authorized by IGRA. First, it is arguable that a federal connection—here, a
tribal-state compact and a third casino on federally-recognized Indian
land—is not necessary for application of rational-basis review, as opposed
to strict scrutiny review.148 A preeminent Indian law source notes that the
Supreme Court has held “that the federal relationship with tribes does not
preclude protective state laws which do not infringe on federally protected
rights. . . . If Indians are a legitimate classification for protective federal

144

Rather, the Act calls only for an amendment to state law once the tribal business entity selects
and enters into an agreement with a municipality. 2015 Conn. Acts 1485 (Spec. Sess.).
145
See supra Part II.A.
146
KG Urban Enterprises, LLC v. Patrick (KG Urban II), 693 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2012).
147
If the Act met the requirements of IGRA, it would easily fulfill Congress’ goals under IGRA.
In United States v. Garrett, the Fourth Circuit upheld North Carolina’s gaming law in an attack on its
constitutionality regarding differing treatment of a non-Indian gaming operator from the state’s Eastern
Band of Cherokee Indians because it fulfilled the goals of IGRA. 122 F. App’x 628, 633 (4th Cir.
2005). First noting the existence of a state-tribal compact between North Carolina and the tribe, the
court reasoned:
Applying the rational basis standard for Indian tribal preferences set forth in
Mancari, we hold that the gaming preferences given to the Eastern Band of
Cherokee Indians are rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest. The
laws creating this preference “promot[e] the economic development of federally
recognized Indian tribes (and thus their members)[.]” . . . The Supreme Court has
explicitly held that this goal constitutes not just a legitimate, but an important
government interest . . . . It also appears undisputed that gaming operators derive
significant profits from their business. Therefore, gaming preferences for Indian
tribes conducted on tribal land are a rational means of ensuring the economic
development of the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians. For these reasons, North
Carolina’s State-Tribal Compact and the scheme set forth by the IGRA easily pass
muster under the rational basis standard of review.
Id. (citations omitted).
148
Koenig & Stein, supra note 14, at 370.
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laws, their status is arguably the same for state laws of that character.” 149
Such an argument would rely on the theory that the lack of a federal
connection is not fatal to the constitutionality of Connecticut’s law.
Moreover, it can be argued that the character of classification does not
change because a state, and not the federal government, defines it.150
Secondly, proponents may argue that the Act’s goals parallel those of
IGRA: IGRA states that “a principal goal of Federal Indian policy is to
promote tribal economic development, [and] tribal self-sufficiency” and as
Connecticut’s two casinos have been successful at this already, the third
under the Act would do the same.151 Proponents would demonstrate that
casinos foster tribal economic development and self-sufficiency by relying
on the fact that casino gaming has already generated thousands of jobs
(including jobs for tribal members), raised revenue for tribes, and helped
remove tribal members from welfare.152 A third casino in Connecticut
would presumably do the same for the state and for the region, thereby
fostering the two Tribes’ economic development and self-sufficiency.
B. The Attack on Morton v. Mancari
This Note posits that a developing trend, as seen in Artichoke Joe’s and
KG Urban, reflects insight more subtle than just the forthcoming judicial
analysis of the constitutional challenges to the Act by the Connecticut
district court. Artichoke Joe’s and KG Urban represent circuit courts’
skepticism of the constitutional framework regarding the analysis of state
laws governing tribal gaming and the increasing attack on the Mancari
“political versus racial classification” doctrine. Connecticut, by granting its
two tribes a monopoly on casino-gaming completely outside of IGRA, has
overstepped the boundaries and contours of the federal government’s
obligations to Indians. Connecticut’s Act may be the first in a series of
state laws “granting gratuitous Indian preferences”153 that seek to retain the
benefits of tribal gaming within their borders by manipulating the federal
regulatory framework and the corresponding constitutional analysis. The
Act has warped the outer contours of IGRA to a point where arguably the
federal statute is no longer recognizable. As a result, the Supreme Court
may be forced to adapt by implementing a more scrutinizing level of
review to be applied when deciding challenges to state tribal-gaming laws.
COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 17, at 659.
“On the one hand, the nature of a classification, in theory, should not change based upon the
identity of the sovereign making it. If a classification is political when the federal government makes it,
it is difficult to imagine that it could be anything other than political when a state or local government
makes it.” KG Urban I, 839 F. Supp. 2d 388, 403 (D. Mass. 2012).
151
See 25 U.S.C. § 2701(4) (2012).
152
Koenig & Stein, supra note 14, at 373–74.
153
KG Urban I, 839 F. Supp. 2d at 404.
149
150
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Litigation since Mancari and lawyers representing sides both for and
against tribal interests have noted the mounting attack on preferential
treatment for Indians.154 Interests contrary to Indian preferences have made
a “concerted effort to put key . . . doctrines before the [Supreme] Court.
One of the best examples of this is the repeated effort to get the Court to
revisit the critical holding in Morton v. Mancari.”155 Advocates for stricter
judicial scrutiny of preferential Indian laws cite to the 1995 case Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, in which the Supreme Court held that all racial
classifications must be analyzed under strict scrutiny review, as support
that Mancari is no longer applicable.156 The Adarand rule has been used by
advocates against Indian interests to justify applying strict scrutiny, even
for laws that further Congress’ obligations toward Indians.157 For example,
in another opinion, the Ninth Circuit had the opportunity to reflect on the
effect of Adarand on Mancari, stating that:
The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Adarand only adds
to our constitutional doubts. . . . In Adarand, the Court ruled
that racial classifications by the federal government are
subject to strict scrutiny. . . . Justice Stevens in dissent argued
that the majority’s ‘concept of consistency . . . would view
the special preferences that the National Government has
provided to Native Americans since 1834 as comparable to
the official discrimination against African Americans that
was prevalent for much of our history.’ If Justice Stevens is
right about the logical implications of Adarand, Mancari’s
days are numbered.158
Another manner by which opponents have argued to reverse Mancari
is to limit its application to only uniquely Indian interests, which is defined
as interests protected by legislation that “relat[e] to Indian lands, tribal

154
See Goldberg, supra note 8, at 951 (listing examples of litigation, legislation and scholarly
work attacking the Mancari doctrine).
155
Smith & Mayhew, supra note 23, at 48.
156
515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995).
157
See Smith & Mayhew, supra note 23 (documenting uses of the holding in Adarand as the basis
for several petitions to the Supreme Court to overturn Mancari).
158
Williams v. Babbitt, 115 F.3d 657, 665 (9th Cir. 1997) (citations omitted). The Ninth Circuit
reviewed an equal protection challenge to the Reindeer Act of 1937, which limited the sale of reindeers
in Alaska to non-natives to provide Alaska natives with economic security and a stable food supply. In
their petition for certiorari, the Williams appellees argued for Supreme Court review to decide whether
rational-basis review adopted in Mancari would continue to be applied to constitutional challenges to
congressional laws favoring Indians, however, the Supreme Court declined to consider the case. See
Kawerak Reindeer Herders Ass’n v. Williams, 523 U.S. 1117 (1998) (denying the appellees’ petition
for writ of certiorari).
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status, self-government or culture.”
In Mancari, the unique Indian
interest was the employment preference for hiring Indians to the federal
Bureau of Indian Affairs and was designed expressly to foster tribal selfgovernment.160 It is doubtful that a casino monopoly, a sure result of
Connecticut’s law, would be such a “unique” Indian interest.161 Against
this backdrop of judicial skepticism and forceful advocacy to overturn the
Mancari framework, Connecticut’s legislation stands poised to finally push
the Supreme Court to review its Indian law jurisprudence.162
159

C. Connecticut’s Role in the Mancari Attack
The Supreme Court has not addressed whether state or local laws
granting Indians preferential treatment should be reviewed under the same
lenient rational-basis review as federal laws doing the same. In that void,
states remain free to push the boundaries as far as this current
constitutional framework will allow them. Accordingly, Connecticut has
capitalized in this area. While questions of equal protection and the status
of state classifications are crucial here, the dormant commerce clause issue
still looms large in the background. Underlying a piece of legislation that
on its face seems to abide by the Constitution, Connecticut has sought to
advance its own economic interests in the name of tribal self-sufficiency
and tribal self-government.163 While there is nothing technically wrong
with a state advancing certain industries within its borders or creating jobs
for its individual citizens, a reviewing court must be wary when a state
manipulates the Indian constitutional framework to achieve such goals.
IGRA, Mancari, and their respective acceptance of racially preferential
treatment of Indians must remain connected to Congress’ obligation
towards Indians. Without a stake in IGRA, states should be monitored
closely when passing legislation that shows favoritism towards Indians at
the expense of others. Courts, and most importantly the Supreme Court,
must react accordingly. While the First and Ninth circuits rightfully
expressed skepticism at the constitutional framework, they nonetheless
159
See Response of Guardian Ad Litem in Support of Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Adoptive
Couple v. Baby Girl, No. 12-399, 2012 WL 5209997, at *11 (Oct. 22, 2012) (advocating that the
Mancari doctrine should be overturned upon Supreme Court review).
160
Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 537 (1974).
161
The Williams court, for instance, expressed its doubts that casino gambling is a uniquely
Indian interest: “[f]or example, we seriously doubt that Congress could give Indians a complete
monopoly on the casino industry or on Space Shuttle Contracts.” Williams, 115 F.3d at 665.
162
So far, the Supreme Court has denied petitions for certiorari in cases, among others,
challenging the Reindeer Act of 1937, Kawerak Reindeer Herders Ass’n, 523 U.S. 1117; the California
state constitutional amendment at issue in Artichoke Joe’s v. Norton, 543 U.S. 815 (2004); and federal
flight limitations over the Grand Canyon, AirStar Helicopters, Inc. v. FAA, 538 U.S. 977 (2003).
163
See Memorandum in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint at
Exhibit 6, supra note 138 (reporting Senator Looney’s remarks on the Connecticut General Assembly’s
goals behind the Act).
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upheld the state legislation at issue. Connecticut’s law, however, may be
finally starting to push the right buttons to trigger an overhaul of judicial
scrutiny. If it does, this Note argues only that a more intricate level of
analysis is required and not that a stricter level of scrutiny necessarily be
applied in every challenge to state laws granting preferential status to
Indians per se. Rather, courts should take the time to truly parse through
state legislation to ensure it adheres to the framework established in IGRA.
This can be accomplished by first ensuring that legislation dealing with
tribal gaming adheres in some manner to IGRA, either explicitly or by
reflection. Then, only after such determination, can a court apply the
Mancari and Yakima frameworks to ensure that a state has acted
constitutionally with its preferential legislation. Without a more detailed
level of judicial scrutiny in this area, states will remain free to exploit tribal
gaming in their borders for in-state economic benefits in the name of
“tribal self-sufficiency and growth.”

